State’s Kramer on U.S.–Ukrainian Relations

Ukraine on track to succeed in political, economic development

A Key Moment in Ukraine-American Relations

David J. Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs

Lecture on U.S.-Ukrainian Relations, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

Cambridge, Massachusetts

December 7, 2007

[As prepared]

Thank you for that kind introduction. And thanks to all you for turning out as well. We have a visitor who made it from another city whom I’d like to recognize, and that is Archbishop Sulyk of Philadelphia.

It’s good to be back at Harvard, where I studied a country, the Soviet Union, that, I’m pleased to say, no longer exists. Conversely, I’m here to speak to you today about a country that was at the time I was a student a republic only on paper.

Today’s date should remind us that events are difficult to forecast. Today is known as the day that will live in infamy, and for those of you who are younger and may not immediately recognize the quote, no, I’m not warning you about my speech. Today of course is the 66th anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

Closer to my line of work, today is the 20th anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival in Washington for a key summit with President Reagan, in what became a historic visit many of us remember vividly. Coming after a long line of gray, truculent leaders going back decades, Gorbachev was clearly a new face and, for at least that reason, a breath of fresh air. He wowed Washington publics during the summit, giving his security detail nightmares by bursting out of his limousine to dive into street crowds. It was a seminal event in U.S.-Soviet relations.

I will leave aside for the moment the debate over whether Gorbachev succeeded in freeing Russians, Ukrainians, and others from Stalinism or failed in his plan to reform communism and make the Soviet system permanent by giving it a human face. For us what matters at the moment is what happened.

The result of his years in power is that the Soviet Union broke up, freeing the 15 so-called republics to go their own way. The 15 were all over the map, quite literally, but also in terms of their history, internal cohesiveness and economic development. Not surprisingly, they have met with varying levels of success in terms of economic development, political liberty and the overall happiness of their people.

None of the countries that finally separated themselves from Russia is as populated or as important to regional history — and to Russianness, from the clouded Russian perspective — than Ukraine. Before Russia and Belarus there was Rus, and we all know where that was. It was the princes and princesses of Kyivan Rus who first adopted Orthodox Christianity. Another country and civilization developed later in the back-woods Duchy of Muscovy, but Ukraine was first — but no less important — work of reforming Ukraine’s polity, economy, and society.– she wants to eliminate RosUkrEnergo; I have also on occasion heard Viktor Yanukovych say the same thing. The key is not to replace RosUkrEnergo with another middleman company, but to eliminate that kind of role entirely.— ensuring energy security, fighting corruption and building institutions, and enhancing open markets—Ukraine can achieve many if not most of its domestic and international goals.

Today Ukraine can be first again. It has enormous potential, it has all it needs to succeed, to be at the forefront that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union in economic and political development. To do so, it must overcome the past and forge headlong into the future, a future Ukraine’s nearly 47 million people deserve.
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Noua Ordine Mondiala in chinurile facerii. Azi, Kosovo. Maine? *
Ce vor SUA de la Ucraina

AlterMedia: Official Report – DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGES
CAUSED BY THE NATO AGGRESSION

* BBC: Efectele cancerigene ale bombelor cu uraniu in Balcani

Kosovo si Metohia: Istorie si Atrocitati

* Kosovo – cutia Pandorei

Romania si consecintele geopolitice ale interventiei militare din 1999 @ Razboiul: executie – costuri – consecinte @ Efecte ale razboiului suportate de tarilor dunarene @ Esecul “pasnicei convietuirii multietnice” in Kosovo @ Factor de destabilizare a regiunii sud–est europene @ „KFOR a distrus granitele dintre Albania si Kosovo” @ Iugoslavia, strategia de dezvoltare si Geopolitica Balcanilor adriatici @ Axele si subzonele geopolitice ale Balcanilor @ Stabilitatea regionala si integrarea economica @ Serbia – elementul vital al balantei regionale @ Deschiderea pietei resurselor @ “Butoiul cu pulbere” – butoiul cu miere @ Lichidarea patrimoniului fostei Iugoslavii

Romania in fata provocarii Kosovo este din nou intr-un moment de rascruce, intre marile puteri. Materialul de mai jos, care face parte din volumul in curs de editare “Kosovo si razboiul sfarsitului Iugoslaviei”, isi propune sa clarifice cateva aspecte geopolitice. Reproducerea este permisa si incurajata cu conditia citarii lucrarii, autorului si a sursei.

O buna parte din datele si informatiile cuprinse au fost prezentate de catre autor, in calitate de corespondent de razboi al unui cotidian central din Bucuresti si de reprezentant al unor organizatii preocupate de stabilitatea regionala si de dezvoltarea durabila in cursul unor conferinte internationale, desfasurate in perioada razboiului si dupa razboi, in Romania, Grecia, Ungaria, Croatia, Slovacia si Serbia. Punctele de vedere ale autorului, prezentate in cadrul conferintelor incepand cu 1999 sunt in mare parte confirmate abia acum, la trecerea a opt ani de la incheierea razboiului pentru Kosovo, cand “comunitatea internationala” a intrat din nou in criza. Notele, bibliografia si alte date suplimentare vor putea fi consultate odata cu aparitia volumului.

George Roncea

Decembrie 2007

Consecinte geopolitice ale interventiei militare din 1999

Analiza razboiului, a felului in care a fost dus si a rezultatelor obtinute constituie un sector important al acestei lucrari dar si evaluarea orizontului regiunii sud-est europene dupa interventia trupelor NATO in Kosovo.

Este greu de stabilit cu precizie care a fost punctul de plecare real de la care a pornit razboiul si probabil ca nici nu a fost un motiv singular. Cel putin la suprafata au fost vizibile mai multe feluri de interese care au fost jucate in conflictul din Kosovo: de la incercarea disperata a NATO de a juca un rol dupa Razboiul Rece pana la dorinta lui Clinton de a gasi un dusman concret in perioada post-Lewinsky, pentru a arata – urbi et orbi – ca este un om de stat moral responsabil. De la dorinta SUA de a-si reafirma pozitia in relatiile transatlantice in contextul Tratatului de la Amsterdam si a aplicarii uniunii monetare europene la dorinta statelor UE de a preveni afluxul de milioane de refugiati kosovari. De la autoprezentarea fortei militare ca un fel de elita transnationala la interese industriale si tehnologice.

Un rol covarsitor in declansarea razboiului impotriva Serbiei il poarta si un anumit discurs despre putere, de sorginte americana in cea mai mare parte, discursul moral al “Occidentului” (de exemplu, NATO ca o “comunitate de valori”) in perioada de dupa Razboiul Rece. Incercand sa se autoimpuna ca o norma de comportament globala, discursul moral pretinde ca sprijina uneori suveranitatea (Kuweit), alteori drepturile omului (Kosovo) ba chiar recent, brusc, ii invoca pana si pe kurzii turci de care nu a pasat nimanui in ultimii zece ani. Noutatea povestirilor, ca sa nu spunem basmelor, despre “axa Raului” cu care s-ar confrunta aprig cavalerii americani ai justitiei universale, istorisite la gura sobei de inteleptul Obi One Kenobi din Texas este structura narativa specifica superproductiilor de gang Hollywoodiene. Poleiala si paietele acestui nou discurs “etic” – in realitate unul despre putere si expansiune, nu pot ascunde tenebrele din fundal unde se ghiceste instrumentalizarea in propriu avantaj a conflictelor specifice, actualele afirmatii – povestiri – cum le-am zis cu ingaduinta – urmand o veche traditie, de secole, ce aminteste retorica Omului Alb, discursul care a insotit colonizarea occidentala in ultimii 500 de ani.

NATO a devenit dintr-o forta defensiva de protectie a Europei in fata amenintarii rusesti o forta de interventie americana, un instrument de impunere – manu militari – a intereselor economice, politice si geostrategice americane, in principal. Aceasta transformare care a remodelat NATO pe liniile de forta ale conceptelor geo-strategice americane este una dintre semnificatiile importante ale razboiului pentru Kosovo. Ca urmare a schimbarii vadite a rolului si functionarii Aliantei pe durata razboiului dar mai ales incheierea bombardamentelor au aparut la suprafata profunde discordante dintre partenerii NATO asupra rolului si rostului aliantei. Dezbaterea asupra utilitatii reale a NATO are deja un istoric.

Astfel, in noiembrie 1991, la conferinta de la Roma, presedintele Frantei, Francois Mitterrand a lansat propunerea dezvoltarii unei organizatii de aparare europene care formal ar fi urmat sa fie asociata cu NATO dar in acelasi timp ar fi avut calitatea de a actiona independent de Statele Unite. Argumentul era faptul ca, odata cu disolutia Pactului de la Varsovia, in iulie 1991, necesitatea protectiei Europei de catre americani disparea (in prezent in Europa se afla 62 000 de militari americani). Ceilalti membri europeni au respins ideea constructiei unei aliante militare independente care ar fi putut duce la disolutia NATO, iar de atunci incercarile europene de creare a unui sistem de aparare distinct nu au mers mai departe de gesturi si declaratii simbolice.

Intre timp, odata cu transformarea NATO intr-o forta de interventie globala, Statelor Unite revenindu-le rolul dominant, Franta a tras concluzia ca este necesara o mai puternica integrare militara alaturi de NATO. Ca atare in timpul interventiei militare impotriva Yugoslaviei, dintre toate natiunile europene Franta a contribuit cu cel mai important contigent de soldati. Cu toate acestea, sistematic, Franta a fost evitata sau chiar exclusa din procesul deciziilor militare in timpul ostilitatilor.

Situatia Frantei nu a fost singulara, iar dupa razboi s-au facut auzite din ce in ce mai multe plangeri ale aliatilor europeni deranjati de stilul de conducere american. Divergentele au fost mult mai multe dar datorita masurilor de cenzura miltara au razbatut la suprafata doar cateva semnificative, printre altele cu privire la selectia tintelor, de exemplu. In esenta era clar ca americanii vad in alb si negru, sau mai exact in rosu si negru fie si daca avem in vedere ca pilotii americani ii numeau pe sarbi “rosii”, asa cum fusesera invatati sa denumeasca dusmanul in timpul razboiului rece (este interesanta schematizarea dincolo de orice limita a perceptiilor americane despre sarbi – in acest context. Se pare ca nimeni nu le-a spus pilotilor americani ca Iugoslavia a fost liderul miscarii tarilor nealiniate, nici despre ostilitatea cvasirecunoscuta dintre sovietici si sarbi, de dupa al doilea razboi mondial, aceeasi perioada in care Statele Unite sprijineau logistic Uniunea Sovietica. Ca atare “rosii”, ar fi putut fi desemnati sarbii, admitand existenta unui tipar logic, doar, poate, in urma americanilor).

Razboiul impotriva Iugoslaviei a readus la suprafata tensiunile dintre Lumea Veche si Lumea Noua iar hegemonia americana a reinceput sa fie pusa in discutie in plan european, cu atat mai mult cu cat imediat dupa razboi, dolarul american a surclasat proaspata moneda europeana, care a ajuns in raport de subordonare fata de dolarul american.

Razboiul: executie – costuri – consecinte

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BBC:
Depleted uranium ‘threatens
Balkan cancer epidemic’

By Environment Correspondent Alex Kirby

A British scientist says the Americans’ use of depleted
uranium weapons in the war with Serbia is likely to
cause 10,000 extra deaths from cancer.

A British biologist, Roger Coghill, says he expects the
depleted uranium (DU) weapons used by US aircraft
over Kosovo will cause more than 10,000 fatal cancer
cases.

Mr Coghill, who runs his own research laboratory in
south Wales, was speaking at a London conference
called to discuss the use by American and British forces
of DU in Iraq in the 1991 Gulf war.

High radiation levels

He said there had been evidence in other parts of the
Balkans of elevated radiatio
In mid-June scientists at
Kozani in northern Greece
were reporting that radiation
levels were 25% above
normal whenever the wind
blew from the direction of
Kosovo.
And Bulgarian researchers
reported finding levels eight
times higher than usual
within Bulgaria itself, and up
to 30 times higher
DU is a by-product of the enrichment of uranium for
making nuclear weapons and reactor fuel. It is 1.7
times heavier than lead, and is used for making
armour-piercing rounds.

Safety controversy

Both the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence insist
that it poses no significant danger. But Mr Coghill says
that, while DU in its inert form is safe enough, when it
strikes a target it does become a real danger.
“In an impact DU catches fire, and much of the round is
turned into burning dust. The particles are extremely
small, they can travel up to 300 kilometres. They are
also beta-emitters, which are dangerous if inhaled.”
The particles can then lodge in the lungs, resisting the
body’s attempts to flush them out, and can wreak havoc
with the immune system. They can migrate to any
tissue, though they often make for the kidneys.
Using calculations based on the Pentagon’s statement
that one in five of the rounds fired by its A-10 aircraft
over Kosovo were DU munitions, Mr Coghill estimates
that more than 500,000 DU rounds were fired, of which
half detonated.

He says that would have resulted in the release of
about one thirty-thousandth of the amount of radiation
released at Chernobyl in 1986. “But that was in the
form of caesium on the ground. This is free-floating
particulate matter.”

Delayed effect

Mr Coghill says the maximum effect will be reached
about six months after the war, and he thinks the first
cancers – probably leukaemias – will start to show up
about a year after that.

“Throughout the Balkan region, I calculate that there
will be an extra 10,150 deaths from cancer because of
the use of DU. That will include local people, K-FOR
personnel, aid workers, everyone.”

He accepts that doubts remain over the effects of DU,
and says it is vital to listen to critics who suggest that
the higher cancer rates seen in parts of Iraq may have
been caused by chemical weapons instead.

However, Mr Coghill notes that Bosnia, where DU
weapons were used in 1995, was not attacked with
chemical munitions, unlike Iraq.

“No epidemiological study can ever prove causality – all
it can do is show an association. For proof, you need
human, animal and cellular studies. All of those have
been carried out on DU, and they support the
association,” says Mr Coghill.

“The total evidence is strong that DU is behind Gulf
War Syndrome, and the
“The birth deformities seen in the Gulf are identical to
those seen in Bosnia, and in the children of some US
service personnel who were exposed to DU.”

He says there is telling confirmation of his distrust of
DU. It comes in the form of evidence submitted by
radiation physicists at the University of Maryland to the
US Department of Energy in April on the long-term use
of DU.

“They concluded that DU should never be used in a
battlefield scenario, because of its hazards to health.”