THE BLACK SEA Security Agenda

Cititi in baza acestui text: Interviu exclusiv cu analistul american al Centrului pentru Studii Strategice si Internationale, Janusz Bugajski: “ESTE NEVOIE DE TRUPE NATO IN MOLDOVA”

Presentation by Janusz Bugajski

I will lay out five challenges in the Black Sea area that make this region an important
factor in trans-Atlantic relations and for the future of both the EU and NATO. And of
course, as a member of both NATO and the EU, Romania plays a pivotal role in securing
this region in terms of democratic, economic, regional, and integrative development.

1. Strategic Location

The Black Sea region connects the EU and NATO with the Middle East, the Caspian
zone, and Central Asia – three areas that will be critical for U.S. and EU security interests
over the coming decade. A multitude of security threats challenge the region, including
international jihadist terrorism, weapons proliferation, international organized crime, and
potential natural disasters such as epidemics, climatic changes, and environmental
disasters. As a result, a coherent strategy for durable stability and sustainable security
needs to be devised and implemented by the EU and U.S. working in tandem with the
countries of the region, especially with those capitals that are members of either the EU
or NATO or are seeking entry.

2. Strategic Competition

The Black Sea region has become a battleground between Atlanticism and Eurasianism,
in essence between the West and Russia, as both sides seek to project and defend their
influences and strategic interests. Russia has developed into a neo-imperialist power
seeking to restore its spheres of dominance, to undermine the emergence of a Wider
Europe that includes Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and to prevent the development of
an expanded and coherent trans-Atlantic community. Under the Vladimir Putin
presidency, the Russian Federation has set itself an ambitious foreign policy target by
developing as a “strategic pole” that will counter-balance U.S. influence. The key
component of this strategy is to raise Russia’s global stature and to diminish America’s
role by undermining the NATO alliance and neutralizing the EU along its peripheries.
The political transition in Russia from a Putin presidency to a successor to be elected in
March 2008 will further enhance the process of assertion and expansion.

3. Energy Security

Major energy supplies to Europe from the Caspian Basin will increasingly traverse the
Caucasus and Black Sea regions and their transit needs to be secured from potential
disruption, whether as a result of deliberate blockages by suppliers or transit countries or
sabotage by sub-state actors and international terrorist networks.

Supply transit needs to
be assured to all consumers and such guarantees are best served by diversifying suppliers
and routes in case of blackmail or sabotage and bringing the entire region under a more
secure NATO umbrella. However, Russia sees European energy diversification as a
threat to its expansive state interests and as it would lessen or even reverse Moscow’s
growing political influence in using the energy lever. As a result, Russia has sought to
monopolize diverse suppliers in Central Asia, to purchase vital energy infrastructure
across Europe, and to undercut the potential of developing sources and supply routes that
bypass Russian territory or Russia’s control.

4. State Stability

There are several reasons why the former Soviet-occupied territories, including the Black
Sea and trans-Caucasian region are important for the security of the European continent
and the Atlantic Alliance.

Regarding questions of state stability, weak states, divided
states, and authoritarian states are a threat to their own security and to the security of their
neighbors. Moldova, Georgia, and potentially Ukraine are politically polarized and
divided states where the absence of territorial integrity and elite consensus corrupts state
institutions, fosters organized crime, undermines economic development, discourages
foreign investment, and prevents regional cooperation.

These states are also susceptible to Russian government manipulation, economic
blackmail, and political pressure precisely because they remain weak and divided.
Moscow prefers to have either authoritarian, divided, or weak states along its borders
rather than pro-Western democracies or strategically neutral regimes. Ongoing Kremlin
support for the Transnistrian separatists in Moldova and the Abkhaz and Ossetian
secessionist movements in Georgia, demonstrates Moscow’s strategy of promoting
vulnerable and dependent neighbors.

As a consequence, a variety of military and sub-military threats challenge the region,
including a spillover of armed conflict from the Moscow-sponsored separatist entities in
Moldova and Georgia; Russian military involvement among neighbors in preventing state
integration; and Russian military, nuclear, and anti-missile shield build-up to project its
growing assertiveness. A potential escalation of armed conflict between Georgia and the
two separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia may also precipitate a wider
conflict by drawing in neighboring powers and even the U.S. and the EU into the conflict.

5. Euro-Atlantic Aspirations

The post-Soviet countries of Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia face serious obstacles to
their prospective Euro-Atlantic integration. Among the notable challenges and
obstructions they will need to overcome are internal political divisions and potential
public opposition, the resistance of the Russian administration to further NATO and EU
expansion eastward, separatist forces supported by Moscow and designed to keep these
states off balance, and the hesitation of EU and Allied capitals in offering clear
membership prospects.

Unfortunately, the EU has treated the “post-Soviet” countries differently from the
western Balkan states, which have been offered the prospect of EU accession through
stabilization and association agreements provided that they fulfill the required
membership criteria. By contrast, the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has not
offered the prospect of EU membership to the remaining East European states; instead,
they were given ENP action plans that would steadily engage them in EU networks and
programs. Without more effective incentives for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and
potentially Azerbaijan and Armenia, with a prospect of eventual EU membership, the
ENP is in danger of lacking sufficient momentum and incentive to promote structural
reforms, generating substantial foreign investment, and reinforcing commitments to
Western integration.

Meanwhile, NATO may be willing to enlarge eastward but two factors will need to be
considered before decisions on including any of the remaining Black Sea littoral states
are finalized. First, the commitment of the candidate states, their political elites and
citizens, both to NATO standards and Alliance membership needs to be assured. And
second, a commitment by the Alliance that such inclusion is in the strategic and national
interests of all NATO and EU allies needs to be accepted. In this geo-strategic context,
the Eastern Dimension of the new EU and NATO member states, including Romania, has
involved various campaigns and initiatives to bring their neighbors into the ambit of both
multi-national organizations. And the struggle continues.

Bucharest Conference –
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Romanian Chamber of Commerce, Foundation for Democracy, Culture, and Liberty

25 June 2007


Interviu in exclusivitate cu analistul american al Centrului pentru Studii Strategice si Internationale (CSIS) Janusz Bugajski:


La Tiraspol nu se va schimba nimic pana cand nu va fi indepartat Smirnov

Explicati de ce situatia din Kosovo este diferita de cea din Transnistria.

Sunt mai multe motive. In primul rand contextul: Kosovo a fost o unitate federala a fostei Iugoslavii, avea autonomie, drept de vot in structurile guvernamentale si chiar daca nu avea dreptul de secesiune, avea dreptul la auto-determinare. In cazul Transnistriei, aceasta nu a fost o unitate administrativa in fosta Uniune Sovietica sau in Moldova, a fost creata dupa declararea independentei de catre anumite grupuri de interese.
In al doilea rand, in cazul Kosovo, miscarea de independenta a fost o reactie in fata violentei statului. In Transnistria miscarea separatista a fost destinata prevenirii independentei Moldovei sau tinerii Moldovei departe de institutiile occidentale.
In al treilea rand, as spune ca si compozitia etnica este deosebit de importanta: in Kosovo 92% din populatie sunt albanezi care se opun unei minoritati iar in Transnistria o minoritate se opune unei majoritati. Si nu in ultimul rand as spune ca nu au existat actiuni din partea statului albanez in numele miscarii de independenta, aceasta este o miscare interna. In cazul Transnistriei – probabil ca aceasta nu ar fi existat in lipsa unei sustineri ferme a Moscovei. In cazul Transnistriei este vorba de interese criminale, in vreme ce in Kosovo exista un protectorat international sub egida ONU – este o independenta de fapt, intrebarea este cand va fi obtinuta independenta de jure.

Cum catalogati noul format de negocieri pentru Transnistria, unde SUA si UE sunt doar observatori frustrati? Cum poate functiona acest cadru, cand negocierile sunt de fapt la mana Rusiei si Transnistriei, care, spre dovada, tocmai au anulat ultima runda prevazuta pentru 4 si 5 aprilie?

Este foarte bine sa ai cat mai multe parti implicate, cu atat mai mult cu cat este vorba de Statele Unite si de Uniunea Europeana. Intrebarea este ce influenta pot avea asupra evolutiilor interne din Transnistria. In lipsa unei prezente importante la fata locului – NATO, Uniunea Europeana, alte instrumente – Rusia si transnistrenii vor domina situatia si nu vor permite nici un fel de schimbari in aceasta regiune separatista. Se poate vorbi foarte mult, insa trebuie sa existe si o actiune, ceva trebuie facut. Si nu vad sa se intample asa ceva pana cand nu este indepartat regimul separatist al lui Smirnov, pana cand nu va avea loc un referendum liber sau alegeri libere. Altfel cred ca situatia va continua asa cum este pe termen nedefinit.

Moscova trebuie sa se gandeasca la Cecenia

Haideti totusi sa privim mai departe. Dupa aceasta schimbare. Ce se va intampla in Transnistria diferit de ceea ce se intampla in Kosovo?

Ceea ce incerc sa spun este ca cele doua regiuni nu ar trebui puse laolalta. Insa cred ca Tiraspolul si Moscova vor incerca sa lege aceste chestiuni, vor incerca sa spuna ca Kosovo stabileste un precedent.

Deja Moscova a facut-o, implicit, chiar prin vocea presedintelui Vladimir Putin.

Exact. In ceea ce priveste Moscova cred ca se gaseste intr-o situatie dificila deoarece Kosovo reprezinta un precedent mai important pentru Cecenia decat pentru Transnistria. In Cecenia este vorba de o miscare de independenta reala, in vreme ce in Transnistria este vorba de o clica cu interese strans legate de cele ale Moscovei. Ceea ce cred ca se va intampla dupa independenta Kosovo este ca Moldova, impreuna cu partenerii sai apropiati ca Romania sa construiasca un caz international important, sa explice care sunt diferentele. De aceea propunerea noastra de a sustine o conferinta la Washington cred ca ar putea contribui la acest proces. Este deosebit de important ca membrii marcanti ai ONU, ca Statele Unite si Uniunea Europeana sa inteleaga diferentele dintre cele doua cazuri.

Insa problema cheie ramane prezenta militara rusa.

Tocmai din acest motiv cred ca este novoie de presiuni pentru impunerea unei prezente militare mixte. Exista rusi, pot exista militari NATO, UE sau din alte parti ale lumii – trebuie internationalizata misiunea de mentinere a pacii.

A existat cu ceva vreme in urma o propunere de desfasurare a unor forte europene.

A existat o propunere de desfasurare a unor trupe ale UE. Problema este ca atunci cand trebuie sa actioneze pe cont propriu Uniunea Europeana nu prea are o coloana vertebrala. UE are o baza in astfel de probleme doar cand este intarita de Statele Unite, de aceea este necesar ca Washingtonul sa aiba o perspectiva clara asupra a ceea ce se intampla in Transnistria si ce trebuie facut.

Okay. Va exista o astfel de misiune militara internationala, care ar putea da apa la moara tot Rusiei, care va sustine ca se reproduce cazul Kosovo, insa ce se va intampla dupa? Cum vedeti solutionarea problemei?

Nu cred ca trebuie sa fie chiar ca in Kosovo, fiecare misiune are ceva specific – misiunea din Kosovo a fost trimisa pentru a-i indeparta pe sarbi, pentru a asigura securitatea si granitele si pentru a permite demararea unei constructii democratice. In Transnistria nu exista un astfel de conflict, nu este nevoie de o forta de anvergura, exista deja structuri prezente – deoarece Transnistria este o parte a Moldovei – intrebarea este cum sa fie facute sa functioneze institutiile moldovene pentru a racorda Transnistria inapoi la Moldova. Aceasta este raspunsul.

Moscova ramane port la Marea Neagra

Cum apreciati decizia recenta a Rusiei de a se retrage din Georgia comparativ cu hotararea evidenta de a ramane in Transnistria, ambele conflicte invartindu-se in jurul Marii Negre?

Depinde ce se intelege prin retragere. Daca este vorba de o retragere a unei baze militare asta nu inseamna neaparat o retragere din regiune. Este evident ca Rusia are interese puternice in Abhazia si Osetia de Sud, au existat chiar propuneri de unificare a celor doua Osetii in cadrul Federatiei Ruse. Astfel incat cred ca situatia din Georgia este si mai diferita fata de cea din Moldova si de o gravitate care trebuie urmarita cu aceeasi atentie.

George DAMIAN, Victor RONCEA / ZIUA / 2006

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