Twenty-First Century Security in the OSCE Region

David J. Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs:

Chairman Hastings, Co-Chairman Cardin, Members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss key security challenges that confront the OSCE region, covering a range of issues related to Russia, including the Conventional Forces in Europe (or CFE) Treaty and related 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit commitments, our work with NATO and Russia on missile defense, and a number of other OSCE security issues. I am pleased to testify along with my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dan Fata, with whom colleagues at the State Department and I have a very close, effective relationship.

Working with Russia: the “2+2” Talks

Let me begin with an update on recent developments affecting our dialogue with Russia on security issues. Since the meeting between Presidents Bush and Putin in Kennebunkport in July, we have had three rounds of expert-level meetings on missile defense and three on CFE issues. We have also continued to meet with Allies and partners, including Georgia and Moldova, in parallel.

These exchanges provided important background for the “2+2” talks that took place October 12 between Secretaries Rice and Gates, and their Russian counterparts, Foreign Minister Lavrov and Defense Minister Serdyukov. Those talks included a strategic dialogue on a full range of security issues: missile defense, CFE, post-START arrangements, and arms transfers. Russian officials also discussed their views on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The U.S. side came prepared to make progress and offered creative ideas on the major agenda items. I should say that the meetings were more constructive than most press reports suggested. The Secretaries plan to meet again in six months, this time in the U.S., to continue the dialogue.

Missile Defense and Russia

I will let Secretary Fata take the lead in providing an update on missile defense, but I would like to say a few words about our recent discussions with Russia on this topic. We both were in Moscow with Secretaries Rice and Gates the week of the “2+2” meetings.

I had the opportunity to participate in the experts’ meeting led by Acting Under Secretary of State Rood, along with Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kisylak two days before the arrival of our principals. This marked the third round of U.S.-Russian bilateral discussions on missile defense. Both the U.S. and Russian sides believe the talks were productive. The United States presented Russia with a number of ideas and proposals in order to work through our differences; the Russians expressed appreciation for our proposals. Additionally, we agreed to continue expert-level meetings to fill in some of the details and narrow our differences before the next “2+2” meetings.

One U.S. proposal discussed during our meetings is the possible development of a regional missile defense architecture that would integrate U.S. and Russian defensive assets, including radars. This would enhance our ability to monitor emerging threats from the Middle East and could also include the use of assets from NATO Allies.

Secretaries Rice and Gates also proposed the idea of a phased operations approach. This idea, which is still under development, proposes that the construction of the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic would be completed, while activation of the sites — turning the switch, so to speak — would be tied to specific threat indicators. Although the U.S. and Russia would cooperate to monitor jointly the Iranian missile program, the U.S. would make decisions on how to make our European MD elements operational in response to how we see the threat evolve. The assertion that Washington and Moscow would have to agree jointly whether a sufficient threat exists from a third country (such as Iran) prior to activating any U.S. European-based MD system is incorrect. There is no such agreement or understanding with Russia.

These are forward-leaning proposals, and our Russian counterparts have shown interest in them. Although the Russians have not immediately embraced these proposals, they have said both publicly and privately that they find our proposals interesting and have indicated that they would study them.

We believe it is useful and important to continue this missile defense dialogue with Russia. Despite our differences, it is in our mutual interest to address ballistic missile threats together. Missile threats from the Middle East, particularly Iran, pose a threat to Russia as well as to the United States and our European Allies. Cooperation between the United States and Russia in this domain can enhance the security for both countries and all of Europe, as well as improve overall U.S.-Russian and U.S.-European relations.

The CFE Treaty and the Istanbul Commitments

Let me now turn to the CFE Treaty and the Istanbul commitments, which were a major point of discussion in Moscow, and will continue to be a major issue following the “2+2” meeting. I know that this set of issues is a major concern of the Helsinki Commission, too.

The CFE Treaty has been responsible for the verified destruction of over 60 thousand pieces of military equipment and countless on-site inspections, advancements which have changed the face of European security. Openness and transparency regarding all the major armies in Europe have replaced mistrust and lack of information. The United States and our NATO Allies continue to believe that the CFE Treaty is a cornerstone of European security.

The updated, or Adapted, CFE Treaty was signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999 to take account of changes that had occurred in Europe since 1990, but has not yet entered into force. The United States and NATO Allies, as well as Russia and other CFE states, look forward to its entry into force. Russia says it wants that Treaty to enter into force right away, to replace the current Treaty — which they feel, and we agree, is outdated.

At the time the Adapted Treaty was signed at the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, however, Russia made a number of commitments related to withdrawal of forces and facilities in Georgia and Moldova, in accordance with the core principle of host-country consent to the stationing of foreign forces. Russia also committed to reduce its holding of Treaty-limited equipment to the levels it accepted in the Adapted treaty for the CFE “flank” region.

Russia has made important progress on many of those commitments, particularly in Georgia. While three of Russia’s four major bases in Georgia have been closed, or are nearly closed — two under a 2005 agreement dealing with Akhalkalaki and Batumi — a small number of Russian personnel and supplies remain at the Gudauta base, in the separatist Abkhazia region of Georgia. We are working on a way forward with our Russian and Georgian colleagues, in consultation with Allies, which could resolve this last, remaining issue concerning Georgia.

Russian forces also remain in the Transnistrian region of Moldova, some as peacekeepers under a 1992 ceasefire agreement, and others as guards at a large storage depot, where significant amounts of Soviet-era light arms munitions remain. Moldova wants the ammunition withdrawn or destroyed, and all Russian forces, including the peacekeepers, withdrawn, and replaced by an international presence, though not necessarily a military one; in fact, a civilian force replacement is an idea we are seriously exploring. There has been no progress on Russian withdrawal from Moldova since early 2004, but we are hoping to change that.

Mr. Chairman, our challenge has revolved around Russian authorities’ claims that they have fulfilled all those Istanbul commitments they consider to be related to the CFE Treaty. Russian authorities stress that they do not accept NATO’s linkage between the ratification of the Adapted Treaty and the Istanbul commitments. Mr. Chairman, as you know, neither the United States nor our Allies shares that view.

All of the pledges we refer to as the Istanbul commitments were reflected in the CFE Final Act, a political document agreed by the CFE member states at the time the Adapted Treaty was signed at the Summit. There never were two classes of commitments, some related to CFE, and some not.

This said, we are interested in preserving the CFE regime and finding a way forward. Russian authorities, including President Putin, have cited their frustration with NATO’s lack of movement on ratification, combined with Allies’ insistence that Russia complete the Istanbul commitments, as the reasons behind Russia’s intent to suspend implementation of the current CFE Treaty. Russia has also expressed a number of other concerns about the Treaty’s impact on its own security.

The United States and our Allies have responded clearly that we do not agree that those stated concerns, which relate primarily to NATO enlargement and its consequences, constitute a sufficient basis to suspend implementation of this major Treaty. We have held firmly on the issue of flanks. However, we are working to try to bridge what currently divides us. Russia’s threat to suspend implementation of the current CFE Treaty is a matter of serious concern to the United States and to our NATO Allies. We have said that publicly and we have certainly conveyed that message in our bilateral meetings.

With Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Dan Fried in the lead, we have met with our Russian counterparts again since the “2+2” meetings in Moscow to try to find a way to keep Russia from suspending while maintaining Allies and partners’ equities. We plan to hold another meeting in Europe in a few days. Working with NATO Allies, the United States has developed a set of ideas for moving forward together with Russia on parallel tracks, as a way to make progress on remaining Istanbul commitments and to move forward on ratification of Adapted CFE. If Russia is prepared to commit to move on its remaining Istanbul commitments, some NATO Allies are open to beginning the ratification process while Russia is still in the process of completing them. Allies believe that this would send an important signal of NATO’s continued support for CFE.

I want to stress that, in developing these ideas, the United States and NATO Allies have worked hand-in-glove. We also have been consulting closely with the Georgian and Moldovan governments. I personally traveled to Chisinau after the “2+2” meeting to consult with President Voronin and his government, and separately met with Georgian Foreign Minister Bezhuashvili to elicit his views as well. Assistant Secretary Fried was just in Tbilisi for further consultations. A transparent, consultative process is key to maintaining Allied unity and effectiveness.

Indeed, we have been brainstorming with Allies, and with Moldova and Georgia, to develop creative ideas to help us move forward. Georgian officials have made clear that they consider CFE and the Istanbul commitments to have been responsible for the withdrawal of nearly all of Russia’s military bases and equipment from Georgian territory. They consider this a major success and they, like we, support the Treaty and the Adapted Treaty. They recognize the difficulty of handling the Gudauta question — the facility is located in Abkhazia and Russia claims it is a support facility for its peacekeepers in the region. The Georgians have encouraged the United States to try to facilitate a resolution of this issue with Russia. And that was a major focus in our latest discussions with Russian officials two weeks ago in Berlin.

Similarly, with President Voronin and his team, I discussed ideas for moving forward on withdrawal of Russian munitions at Colbasna; demilitarization of the current Russian-dominated peacekeeping presence; and energizing the Transnistrian political settlements talks. Russia’s military withdrawal commitment is not conditioned on a Transnistrian political settlement, but the issues are unquestionably closely related.

We hope that hard work and creative ideas will enable us to develop a package of steps that makes it possible for the Russian Federation to rescind its plan to suspend implementation of CFE on December 12, and creates the conditions for fulfillment of remaining Istanbul commitments and ratification of Adapted CFE by NATO Allies.

We were rather encouraged by progress we made in our Berlin meeting with Russian officials two weeks ago. We plan further discussions to try to narrow our differences this week. Should we not succeed, it will not be for lack of serious effort. If we do succeed, we can be comforted by the continued security, stability, and predictability CFE provides. Secretary Rice has three goals regarding this issue: to maintain a common NATO approach; to identify ways forward to achieve fulfillment of remaining Istanbul commitments; and to establish conditions that will make it possible for Russia to continue full implementation of the current CFE Treaty, and allow NATO Allies, including the United States, to move forward to seek ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.

On the issue of ratification, I should make clear that the Administration is not seeking to prejudge either the calendar for Senate action on CFE, or the outcome, though we know this Treaty has long enjoyed broad bipartisan support. We would, however, consult with the Senate about ratification if we and Russia are able to reach a deal that prevents Russia from suspending and moves the ball forward on the Istanbul commitments. Our goal is to capitalize on the range of Allies’ ratification processes to send a constructive signal to Moscow that NATO stands by this Treaty.

Working with the OSCE on Additional Security Components

Mr. Chairman, let me shift now to address the effectiveness of the OSCE’s interrelated efforts to combat terrorism, enhance border security and monitor weapons trade in the region, issues, I know, are of interest to this Commission.

The OSCE is at the forefront of counterterrorism efforts in the region and we are encouraged by the results we have seen, both as a security multiplier and in terms of cooperation among countries from the Balkans to the Baltics. The OSCE has proven responsive and effective in coordinating with other international organizations to help train authorities in the region to implement tougher security and counterterrorism practices in areas such as law enforcement, shipping, and document issuance.

One way we are supporting the OSCE’s counterterrorism efforts is by exploring ways for governments to cooperate closely with the private sector and civil society to combat terrorism. The United States and Russia worked together on the Public-Private Partnership Conference held earlier this year under OSCE auspices in Vienna. We are examining concrete proposals to follow up this successful conference, such as an experts’ meeting to highlight critical infrastructure protection “best practices” in 2008.

The United States and Russia are also working together on a decision within the OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We tabled this draft on October 31, and when agreed, it will provide an endorsement by all OSCE participating States for further cooperative action to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.

In the area of border security, the OSCE plays an important role, particularly in Central Asia. The OSCE is currently examining a potential role in helping to train Afghanistan border authorities. The goal of the training would be to increase Afghan capacity to interdict narcotics and other contraband, thus helping stem the flow of goods used to finance insurgency and terrorist operations within the country. In cooperation with the OSCE, the Government of Tajikistan has developed a set of projects, including developing a border security strategy, training border guards and improving immigration controls. Similar projects are being developed and conceptualized for other Central Asian states as well.

Confidence- and security-building measures remain a vital element in the long-term security of the OSCE region, and we continue to work with the OSCE to enhance these measures further. Last year, the United States sponsored a special meeting focused on energizing participating States to begin national implementation of the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, resulting in a Ministerial Decision that endorsed full implementation of 1540 by participating States. In doing so, the OSCE, as a regional organization, has played a key role in supporting the Resolution, and facilitating broader implementation of this key resolution aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This spring, the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) agreed to our proposal to prepare Best Practice Guides for national implementation, and the first U.S. draft guide is under review now.

To better monitor weapons trade in recent years, the FSC has adopted Documents aimed at controlling stockpiles of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and conventional ammunition. The United States has provided funding for a number of SALW destruction projects in Tajikistan, and mélange rocket fuel conversion in Armenia and Georgia. The United States also serves as Coordinator for the FSC Editorial Board charged with preparing Best Practice Guides for safeguarding SALW and Ammunition stocks.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is committed to furthering security for the people of Europe and Eurasia. Our main goals in this area, as I have explained today, are to work constructively with Russia where we can, though we may at times, of course, have to agree to disagree; to continue to press towards entry into force of the Adapted CFE treaty and complete fulfillment of Russia’s Istanbul commitments. We are also committed to ensuring the success of OSCE — efforts to foster and enhance security throughout the region. Thank you again for holding today’s hearing. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

(end transcript)

U.S. Department of State

David J. Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

Testimony Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington, DC

November 5, 2007

***

Exclusivitate: Interviu cu David J. Kramer, adjunctul secretarului de stat american, Condoleezza Rice

“SUNT CONVINS CA VOM AJUNGE LA UN REZULTAT IN TRANSNISTRIA”

Rusia a renuntat la mentinerea egalitatii pe plan militar cu Statele Unite sau NATO, dar pastreaza “suficiente mijloace de descurajare”, pentru a-si asigura securitatea, a declarat adjunctul ministrului Apararii si seful Statului-Major rus, Iuri Baluievski, in 2006. “Nu vom strange cureaua pentru a fi egali cu Statele Unite sau cu NATO. Acesta nu este un obiectiv realizabil”, a declarat el, in timp ce prezenta presei un anuar privind “Fortele armate ruse in 2005”.
“Efectivul fortelor NATO este de patru milioane de persoane. Armata rusa numara 1.134.000 de militari. Este suficient de clar”, a adaugat el.
“Nu intentionam sa intram in razboi cu NATO. Acest lucru apartine trecutului, dar Rusia va avea intotdeauna suficiente capacitati pentru a-i descuraja pe cei care ar incerca sa ii treaca frontierele, pentru a intra in posesia imenselor sale bogatii naturale”, a avertizat el.
Reporterii i-au cerut generalului Baluievski sa comenteze un articol aparut recent in revista americana Foreign Affairs, in care autorii afirma ca Statele Unite sunt pe punctul de a dobandi suprematia nucleara completa, altfel spus, posibilitatea de a distruge, printr-un singur atac, arsenalul de rachete cu raza de actiune lunga al Rusiei sau al Chinei. Conform unui raport al reputatului Consiliu pentru Relatii Externe (CFR) este necesar ca SUA sa inceteze perpetuarea ideei parteneriatului cu Rusia, o tara nedemocratica condusa despotic de Vladimir Putin.

Aflat la Bucuresti, David J. Kramer, adjunctul Secretarului de Stat al SUA Condoleezza Rice, ne spune cam acelasi lucru ca Baluievski, dar in oglinda.
Negociatorul Statelor Unite pentru Transnistria, David J. Kramer, ocupa din iulie 2005 postul de adjunct al Secretarului de Stat responsabil pentru afacerile din Europa si Eurasia in cadrul Departamentului de Stat al SUA, specializat pe problemele din Rusia, Ucraina, Moldova si Belarus. Inainte de iulie 2005 David J. Kramer a fost si membru al Biroului de Planificare Politica din cadrul Departamentului de Stat, reprezentant al numeroase think-tank-uri de prestigiu si analist al Christian Science Monitor Network. Kramer a acordat un interviu in exclusivitate ziarului ZIUA, in 2006, pe care il reproducem integral mai jos tinand cont de valabilitatea afirmatiilor sale.

Ati participat la cateva din rundele de negocieri dintre Tiraspol si Chisinau pe tema diferendului transnistrean. Cum decurg discutiile cu personaje care, atunci cand vor, cum este cazul acum, pur si simplu anuleaza reuniunea? Ce impresii v-au facut pana acum negocierile pentru Transnistria, in format extins, cu SUA si UE ca observatori?

Am participat la trei dintre rundele de negocieri pentru conflictul transnistrean si trebuie sa recunosc ca sunt frustrante. Seamana putin cu filmul “Groundhog Day”, in care unul dintre personaje se trezeste in fiecare zi pentru ca sa traiasca acelasi lucru la nesfarsit. Am participat, cum spuneam, la trei din aceste runde, iar progresele inregistrate sunt nesemnificative, daca nu inexistente, deoarece consider ca, intr-o oarecare masura, unele dintre partile implicate nu sunt chiar interesate de obtinerea unor progrese, ci de mentinerea situatiei actuale. Asteptam cu nerabdare discutiile programate pentru saptamana aceasta, deoarece lucrurile s-au schimbat, in parte datorita acordului vamal dintre guvernele ucrainean si moldovean si implementarii acestuia. Din punctul nostru de vedere, aceasta schimbare a fost una sanatoasa si ne asteptam ca aceasta ultima runda de negoieri sa fie mai interesanta deoarece transnistrenii ar fi trebuit sa admita faptul ca situatia actuala este inacceptabila pentru majoritatea partilor implicate. Nu putem continua ca si cum nu exista nici o problema. Insa transnistrenii nu au agreat…

Ucraina, festina lente la granita cu Transnistria

Dimpotriva, au devenit chiar mai inflexibili dupa implementarea acordului. Insa cum va explicati faptul ca ucrainenii nu s-a grabit pana acum sa implementeze acordul?

Ar trebui intrebati. Acest acord dateaza inca din 2003, partile semnatare si-au reafirmat angajamentele in decembrie 2005, prin intermediul prim-ministrilor din ambele state, si nu stiu de ce a durat atat de mult, insa ma bucur ca a fost implementat. Initial trebuia implementat inaintea rundei de negocieri din ianuarie, insa ucrainenii au decis sa nu o faca. Nu imi sunt clare motivele care au stat la baza deciziei de a face aceasta pe 3 martie, anul acesta, insa ma bucur ca a fost implementat, iar SUA au sprijinit la modul evident Ucraina in acest demers. Consideram ca acordul este important deoarece consolideaza integritatea teritoriala a Republicii Moldova, aducand unele schimbari in cadrul situatiei existente, si demonstreaza, totodata, ca Ucraina poate juca un rol pozitiv important in regiune si, in special, in aceasta chestiune. De asemenea, am fost incantati si de modul in care au reactionat celelalte state la decizia ucraineana, pentru ca Kievul a actionat sub presiune, atat din partea transnistrenilor, cat si a rusilor, ambele parti argumentand ca aceasta reprezinta un pas unilateral nebinevenit si ca Ucraina nu mai isi mai poate indeplini in mod eficient rolul de mediator in conflictul transnistrean. Noi, dimpotriva, consideram implementarea este un semn pozitiv si o salutam ca atare.

Rusii chiar au inventat o “situatie umanitara”…

“Blocada” despre care se vorbeste este o nascocire, un fapt auto-impus. Daca transnistrenii doresc, aceasta poate fi inlaturata imediat. Iar convoiul trimis de Rusia pentru a rezolva o asa-zisa criza umanitara a fost un gest inutil, insa a fost mai bine ca aceasta sa fie lasat sa treaca decat sa se creeze o problema de imagine. Speram ca acum, de vreme ce convoiul a intrat in Transnistria, iar o parte din blocada a fost ridicata de transnistreni, la presiunea propriilor intreprinderi, care sufera de pe urma acesteia, situatia se va normaliza in sensul ca vor obtine timbrele necesare si ca vor putea sa se implice in activitati comerciale legale.

SUA creeaza un echilibru la masa negocierilor

Totusi, deocamdata, tratativele se dovedesc inutile. Cum va simtiti in calitate de reprezentat al SUA la niste discutii la care participa reprezentanti ai unui regim nerecunoscut pe plan international?

Consider ca este important ca UE si SUA sunt reprezentate la aceste discutii. Depunem eforturi in vederea includerii noastre in acestea, desi participam la negocieri doar in calitate de observatori. Cred ca aceasta ajuta la echilibrarea fortelor participante, balanta inclinand, pana acum, in favoarea partii transnistrene. Am incercat sa cream un echilibru in sensul ca SUA si partea europeana sustin integritatea teritoriala si suveranitatea Republicii Moldova in ceea ce priveste regiunea transnistreana. Pornind de la aceasta premisa, am incercat sa gasim modalitati de abordare a diferendului. Am insistat pentru ca Ucraina sa faca pasul implementarii acordului vamal deoarece acesta subliniaza integritatea teritoriala a Moldovei. Dupa cum am mai spus, discutiile sunt frustrante si, in calitate de reprezentant al SUA la masa tratativelor, a trebuit sa traversez Atlanticul de trei ori pentru a participa la acestea. Este mai bine sa te asezi la o masa si sa discuti decat sa nu existe deloc contacte sau negocieri, absenta acestora putand genera conflicte sau probleme de alta natura. Negocierile, dar si actiunile de genul implementarii acordului vamal, pot reprezenta o modalitate de a exercita presiuni asupra unei parti anume. Consideram ca este important sa fim reprezentati la negocieri, insa ne dorim sa vedem si rezultate. O parte a problemei o reprezinta lipsa seriozitatii in ceea ce priveste partea transnistreana. Transnistrenii nu sunt interesati de modificarea situatiei actuale si, totusi, daca vom continua sa exercitam presiuni asupra lor – noi fiind SUA, UE, OSCE, Ucraina – pentru a aborda cu seriozitate aceste negocieri, pentru a lua decizii, ceva se va schimba. Una dintre problemele cu care ne confruntam este faptul ca reprezentantul Tiraspolului adeseori sustine ca nu dispune de autoritatea necesara luarii unei decizii, iar noi l-am invitat sa aduca la discutii persoane abilitate sa ia astfel de decizii, atfel incat sa reusim sa facem ceva. Am putea realiza inclusiv misiuni internationale de evaluare, care ar putea determina aspectele necesare democratizarii Transnistriei astfel incat sa se creeze conditii pentru organizarea alegerilor democratice, dar si misiuni de mentinere a pacii. Sunt convins ca astfel vom ajunge la un rezultat.

Unii analisti si responsabili considera ca, daca Rusia nu isi va retrage trupele si armamentul stationate in regiune, nu se va produce nici o schimbare in Transnistria.

Pozitia SUA referitoare la prezenta Rusiei in regiune este ca Moscova trebuie sa respecte angajamentele asumate la Istanbul inca din 1999, iar misiunea ruseasca de mentinere a pacii nu ajuta la rezolvarea situatiei. Totusi, nu se poate argumenta ca retragerea trupelor rusesti va duce la rezolvarea diferendului, insa acestea ar trebui retrase, in virtutea promisiunilor de la Istanbul.

Rusia si-a anuntat saptamana trecuta intentia de a-si retrage trupele stationate in Georgia. De ce considerati ca a facut aceasta in cazul Georgiei si nu si in cazul Transnistriei?

E o intrebare excelenta si as dori sa am un raspuns la ea, deoarece partea rusa si-a reafimat, vinerea trecuta, punctul de vedere referitor la retragere, prin intermediul unui nou acord cu Georgia si, din cate am vazut, Moscova se tine de cuvant referitor la retragere. Se pare ca mentinerea trupelor detasate in Georgia nu era in interesul Rusiei. Mi-as dori sa fi inteles mai bine ratiunile care au stat in spatele unei astfel de decizii astfel incat sa incercam sa aplicam lectia din Georgia in cazul Moldovei. In Moldova, vorbim de aproximativ 50 de incarcaturi de tren de munitie care ar trebui transferate. O parte a fost deja transferata la sfarsitul lui 2003, dupa care operatiunile de mutare au fost sistate in urma respingerii planului Kozak. Argumentul potrivit caruia nu pot transfera munitia deoarece Igor Smirnov nu le permite aceasta nu tine. Daca Moscova dorea sa transfere munitia, ar fi facut-o. Smirnov nu s-ar fi impotrivit. Astfel, liderul de la Tiraspol poate fi considerat drept o explicatie convenabila si o scuza pentru ca transferul sa nu fie efectuat. Noi am insistat, toamna trecuta, pe langa partea rusa pentru a-i sugera ca un gest asemanator cu cel din cazul Georgiei ar fi primit foarte bine pe plan international. Nu am vazut nici un semn care sa indice cum ca s-ar face pasi in aceasta directie.
Poate este doar o noua actiune de dezinformare strategica a Moscovei.
Am mai auzit acest argument; si-au retras trupele si echipamentele din Georgia, insa vor continua sa creeze probleme in Osetia de Sud si Abhazia. Ar putea fi adevarat, insa chiar daca ar fi adevarat, ar trebui sa admitem si sa acceptam faptul ca s-au inregistrat anumite progrese in regiune si sa insistam in vederea obtinerii de progrese si in alta parte. Indeplinirea angajamentelor asumate in vederea retragerii din Georgia reprezinta un pas important si salutam aceasta, insa insistam, totodata, pentru transarea problemelor din Osetia de Sud si Abhazia. In mod similar, desi constituie subiecte separate, dar asemanatoare din anumite puncte de vedere, dorim ca sa tratam problema retragerii din Moldova ca pe o chestiune separata de problema Transnistreana. Asasar, dorim ca Rusia sa indeplineasca angajamentele asumate la Istanbul si, in acelasi timp, sa incercam sa ii determinam sa abordeze diferendul transnistrean intr-o maniera mai constructiva.

SUA se instaleaza in Romania, prin intermediul bazelor de pe tarmul Marii Negre, si, in acelasi timp, Rusia isi reconsolideaza pozitiile din era sovietica din regiune. Reamplasarea trupelor SUA aici si operatiunea de contracarare a Rusiei ne face sa credem ca Zidul Berlinului s-a mutat pe Prut. Credeti ca acestea vor fi raporturile de acum incolo, avand in vedere zvonurile potrivit carora Romania ar putea constitui un punct cheie in strategia de securitate a SUA?

Rusia este prezenta in state care i-au cerut sa plece. Rusia a semnat, de asemenea, acordul de la Istanbul, care prevede retragerea trupelor rusesti din Georgia si Moldova. Indiferent de locurile in care ar alege SUA sa mearga, nu se vor duce niciodata in locuri in care nu sunt binevenite. Trupele rusesti nu mai sunt binevenite in Georgia si Moldova deoarece guvernelor suverane ale acestora state le-au cerut sa plece. Asadar, orice miscare a SUA va fi facuta astfel incat sa fie binevenita in orice tara si nu va exista vreo situatie in care sa incercam sa ne impunem in vreun fel.

Competitia cu Rusia este nesanatoasa

Insa Rusia reactioneaza la actiunile SUA, va urmaresc si isi consolideaza pozitiile in oglinda oriunde v-ati duce.

Posibil, insa o competitie de genul acesta nu este sanatoasa si nu incercam sa concuram cu rusii. Incercam sa ne pozitionam fortele astfel incat sa putem raspunde noilor amenintari, care nu existau in perioada Razboiului Rece. Trebuie sa ne mentinem flexibilitatea, sa fim capabili sa ne pozitionam astfel incat sa putem raspunde amenintarilor nu numai la adresa noastra, ci si la adresa aliatilor nostri. Facand aceasta, am specificat ca nu realizam toate acestea intr-o modalitate care ar putea fi interpretata drept o amenintare la adresa Moscovei. Dupa cum ne-am stabilit in Asia Centrala, fara ca bazele noastre de acolo sa constituie o amenintare la adresa Rusiei, avem in vedere si alte aranjamente care tin de securitate si care, in mod similar, nu constituie o amenintare la adresa Moscovei. Incercam sa stam deoparte si sa ne convingem interlocutorii rusi ca nu ne aflam intr-o competitie cu ei, ci ca incercam sa raspundem unor noi amenintari astfel incat sa sporim stabilitatea si securitatea SUA, dar si a aliatilor nostri. Ne dorim, de asemenea, ca Rusia sa se simta mai in siguranta si mai stabil, asadar nici unul din demersurile noastre nu ar trebui perceput drept o amenintare la adresa Moscovei. Dorim, de fapt, sa colaboram cu partea rusa in vederea obtinerii stabilitatii si securitatii in zona.

Presedintele Traian Basescu a declansat discutiile despre internationalizarea Marii Negre si, in acelasi timp, generalul James Jones a amintit, recent, in Senat, despre proiectul unei posibile Garzi Caspice (Caspian Guard). Rusia se opune ambelor initiative, propunand chiar, dupa modelul impus deja in Marea Neagra, o CaspianSeaFor. Chiar daca ne dorim sau nu, ne aflam in fata unei pozitii adverse. Cum vedeti viitorul cooperarii la Marea Neagra in aceste conditii?

Colaborarea cu partea rusa este in interesul tuturor. Abordarea pe care ne-o dorim este pe cale de cooperare astfel incat sa determinam Rusia sa isi asume un rol important in toate acestea. Consider ca o abordare exclusivista ar fi contraproductiva. Insa, totodata, partii ruse ii revin anumite responsabilitati, respectiv sa se implice in dialog. Asadar, rusii pot contribui, la fel ca celelalte state, si sper ca Moscova va interpreta toate acestea intr-un mod care sa nu reprezinte o amenintare sau destabilizare. Obiectivul nostru este opusul, respectiv promovarea securitatii si stabilitatii in regiunea Marii Negre si a Marii Caspice si, din punctul nostru de vedere, Rusia poate juca un rol deosebit de important in aceasta privinta. Insa exista, din nefericire, in anumite cercuri, impresia ca orice miscare in regiune contrazice interesele rusesti. Incercam sa raspundem acestor preocupari si sa subliniem faptul ca orice efort depus in vederea colaborarii cu statele din regiune are in vedere sporirea securitatii si stabilitatii.

SUA nu negociaza pentru Romania

Exista anumite critici referitoare la faptul ca Guvernul nostru nu se prea implica in problema transnistreana in ciuda expertizei pe care am avea-o. Si ca nu ne aflam la masa negocierilor. In replica, Guvernul a afirmat ca, in perspectiva aderarii la spatiul european, Romania va fi reprezentata de delegatul UE. Avand in vedere parteneriatul romano-american, putem considera ca si SUA reprezinta Romania la discutii?

Dupa cum am afirmat, am venit aici asteptandu-ma sa particip la negocierile in format “5+2” si am dorit sa vin inainte de runda de negocieri pentru a avea ocazia de a ma consulta si a discuta punctele noastre de vedere cu privire la problema transnistreana. Nu voi pretinde ca SUA reprezinta Romania sau orice alta tara la aceste negocieri. SUA se reprezinta pe sine. Ceea ce sper sa facem este sa ajungem la un consens in ceea ce priveste punctul de vedere sustinut in cadrul discutiilor pentru Transnistria. Desi Romania inca nu a aderat la spatiul european, UE probabil ca reprezinta toate statele membre. Insa, dupa cum spuneam, prezenta mea aici demonstreaza ca suntem interesati de opinia partii romane in aceasta chestiune, recunoastem rolul pe care Romania l-ar putea juca nu numai in abordarea problemei transnistrene, ci si in regiune. Asadar, acesta este, in mare, mesajul pe care il aduc, respectiv sa ascultam oficialii romani, sa schimbam opinii referitor la aceasta chestiune si presupun ca aceasta nu va fi ultima mea vizita in Romania. Dimpotriva, vor exista vizite si in viitor pentru a determina cea mai buna modalitate de a avansa. SUA nu detine monopolul in ceea ce priveste propunerea de solutii pentru diferendul transnistrean. Consider ca, in urma consultarilor cu Romania, dar si cu alte state din regiune, vom putea gasi impreuna o solutie la aceasta problema, care dureaza de prea mult timp si care, intr-o oarecare masura, afecteaza regiune, asadar vom colabora cu toate partile implicate, aflate la masa dialogului, pentru a gasi o solutie care sa respecte integritatea teritoriala si suveranitatea Moldovei. Atat timp cat exista state care au idei si sugestii pe care vor sa le prezinte SUA, acestea sunt binevenite.

Romania si Marea Neagra joaca un rol important in cadrul noii strategii a Armatei americane. De exemplu, generalul Jones vorbeste despre o forta de interventie rapida in Europa de Est, care ar putea fi desfasurata aici. Insa ce rol ocupa Romania exact in cadrul diplomatiei Departamentului de Stat, avand in vedere conceptul avansat recent de secretarul de Stat Condoleezza Rice de “diplomatie transformationala”?

Ca sa fiu sincer, intrebarea aceasta s-ar adresa, mai degraba, colegului meu, insa trebuie sa va spun ca Romania are o importanta deosebita pentru asigurarea pacii, stabilitatii si securitatii in regiune. Vizita mea aici, dar si cele ale unor persoane mult mai importante, reflecta seriozitatea pe care o manifestam fata de pozitia Romaniei aici si cred ca Romania poate juca un rol important – si deja o face. Faptul ca a fost inclusa in NATO si ca va adera la UE deja sugereaza ca Romania joaca un rol deosebit de important, iar SUA vor continua sa se implice in gasirea unor colaborari constructive pe viitor.

In sfarsit, cum este sa lucrati cu Condoleezza Rice?

Minunat! Este un lider care inspira si a carei notiune de “diplomatie transformationala” se dovedeste deosebit de adecvata, in special in cazul statelor cu care colaborez. Este un secretar de Stat deosebit de eficient, asadar este un privilegiu si o onoare sa colaborez cu domnia sa.

Victor RONCEA